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ABSTRACT
Secure email is increasingly being touted as usable by novice
users, with a push for adoption based on recent concerns
about government surveillance. To determine whether secure
email is ready for grassroots adoption, we employ a labora-
tory user study that recruits pairs of novice users to install
and use several of the latest systems to exchange secure mes-
sages. We present both quantitative and qualitative results
from 25 pairs of novice users as they use Pwm, Tutanota, and
Virtru. Participants report being more at ease with this type
of study and better able to cope with mistakes since both par-
ticipants are “on the same page”. We find that users prefer
integrated solutions over depot-based solutions, and that tu-
torials are important in helping first-time users. Hiding the
details of how a secure email system provides security can
lead to a lack of trust in the system. Participants expressed a
desire to use secure email, but few wanted to use it regularly
and most were unsure of when they might use it.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been an increase in the promotion
of secure email, with tools such as Tutanota [24], Virtru [25],
ProtonMail [13], StartMail [22], Hushmail [11] and others
being pitched for everyday use by novice users. This interest
∗Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory man-
aged and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department
of Energys National Nuclear Security Administration under contract
DE-AC04-94AL85000
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the
author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org.
CHI’16, May 07 – 12, 2016, San Jose, CA, USA.
Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
ACM 978-1-4503-3362-7/16/05$15.00
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858400
is likely spurred by concern over government surveillance of
email, particularly when third-party services such as Gmail
and Hotmail store email in plaintext on their servers. The
Electronic Frontier Foundation has heavily promoted secure
communication and has released a security scorecard of se-
cure messaging systems that includes several email tools [7].
While TextSecure, Signal, WhatsApp, and other secure in-
stant messaging platforms are becoming popular, it is unclear
whether efforts to encourage users to likewise switch to se-
cure email will succeed, given that usable, secure email is
still an unsolved problem more than fifteen years after it was
first formally studied [26]. Moreover, widespread use of se-
cure email partly depends on whether it could be adopted in
a grassroots fashion, where both parties of an email conver-
sation are novice users. All prior laboratory usability studies
of secure email bring one novice user at a time into the lab
and have him or her communicate with a study coordinator
using a secure email system. While this helps researchers un-
derstand how well a novice user can start using secure email
when paired with an expert user, it does not shed light on
whether a pair of novice users can start using the system in-
dependently.
In this work, we conducted the first two-person study of se-
cure email, with 25 pairs of novice users brought into the lab
and asked to exchange secure email between themselves. We
asked participants to bring a friend with them, ensuring the
participants already knew each other, in the hope that partic-
ipants would behave more naturally. Participants then used
several secure email variants without any specific training or
instructions on how to use the systems other than what the
systems themselves provided. The main difference between
this type of study and a traditional single-user study are that
the participants played different roles (initiating contact ver-
sus being introduced to secure email) and that they interacted
with another novice user and not a study coordinator.
In our study, we tested three different secure email systems:
Pwm, Tutanota, and Virtru. Each of these systems represents
a different philosophy related to the integration of secure
email with existing email systems. Pwm integrates secure
email with users’ existing Gmail accounts, allowing them to
compose and receive secure email with a familiar interface. In
contrast, Tutanota is a secure email depot that requires users
to log into Tutanota’s website to interact with their secure
messages. Virtru is a hybrid of these two approaches, allow-
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ing users who install the Virtru plugin to use secure email that
is integrated with Gmail but also allowing non-Virtru users
to receive encrypted email through a depot-based system on
Virtru’s website.
Our results and participant comments lead to the following
contributions:
1. Using pairs of novice users for an email usability study
has several benefits. Having participants play different
roles allowed us to gather data about different types of
first-use cases (i.e., sending a secure email first vs receiv-
ing a secure email first). In addition, participants exhibited
more natural behaviors and indicated that they felt “more at
ease”, that they and their friend were “on the same page” or
at the same level of technical inexpertise, and that they did
not feel discomfort from being “under the microscope”.
2. Hiding the details of how a secure messaging system
provides security can lead to a lack of trust in the sys-
tem. This phenomenon was first noted in some of our ear-
lier work [17], but those results are affected by multiple
confounding factors [1]. This paper provides further ev-
idence that when security details are hidden from users,
users are less likely to trust the system. For example,
although Pwm and Virtru utilize the same authentication
method, Pwm completes authentication without user inter-
action, causing several users to doubt Pwm’s security. Sim-
ilarly, participants like that Tutanota requires that an email
be encrypted with a password since this makes it clear that
the message was protected, unlike other systems that man-
age and use keys behind the scenes.
3. Participants prefer integrated solutions over depot-
based solutions. While to some it may be intuitive that
the participants would prefer to continue using their exist-
ing email accounts, a number of depot-based systems have
appeared recently (e.g., Tutanota, ProtonMail, StartMail).
Our results demonstrate that most everyday users strongly
dislike using separate websites such as secure email depots
to read their email.
4. Tutorials are very important for users of secure email.
When asked what they liked about Pwm and Virtru, par-
ticipants often reported that it was the tutorials presented
alongside these systems. The efficacy of these tutorials is
shown by the fact that while using Pwm and Virtru, partici-
pants were able to quickly complete the study task whereas
while using Tutanota—which lacks a tutorial—participants
took on average 72% longer to complete the study tasks,
often making mistakes as they did so.
5. Participants want the ability to use secure email but are
unsure about when they would use it. Three-quarters of
the participants in our study indicated that they wanted to
be able to encrypt their email, but only one-quarter indi-
cated that they would want to do so frequently. Further-
more, when asked to describe how they would use en-
crypted email in practice, most participants were unsure,
giving only vague references to how secure email might
be useful. This demonstrates a need for future research to
establish whether the true problem facing the adoption of
secure email is usability or that day-to-day users have no
regular need to send sensitive data via email.
RELATED WORK
Whitten and Tygar [26] conducted the first formal user study
of a secure email system (i.e., PGP 5), which uncovered se-
rious usability issues with key management and users’ un-
derstanding of the underlying public key cryptography. They
found that a majority of users were unable to successfully
send encrypted email in the context of a hypothetical politi-
cal campaign scenario. The results of the study took the secu-
rity community by surprise and helped shape modern usable
security research.
Replications of the Whitten and Tygar study were done by
both Garfinkel and Miller [9] and Sheng et al. [20]. Garfinkel
and Miller showed that automatic key management was more
usable than the manual key management present in the orig-
inal experiment. However, the study revealed that the tool
“was a little too transparent” regarding its integration with
Outlook Express. As a result, some users failed to read the
instructions associated with visual indicators. Sheng at al.
demonstrated that despite improvements made to PGP in the
seven years since Whitten and Tygar’s original publication,
key management was still a challenge for users. Furthermore,
they showed that in the new version of PGP, encryption and
decryption had become so transparent that users were unsure
if a message they received had actually been encrypted.
More recently, we conducted a series of user studies with Pri-
vate WebMail (Pwm), a secure email prototype that tightly
integrates with the Gmail web interface [17]. Even though
results showed the system to be quite usable, we found that
some users made mistakes and were hesitant to trust the sys-
tem due to the transparency of its automatic encryption. We
later revised Pwm to address the issues brought up in this ear-
lier usability study [15].
In a replication of our work with Pwm, Atwater et al. ver-
ified that participants responded positively to automatic key
management [1]. They created a mock-up of Mailvelope that
automatically generates keys for users, shares the public key
with a key server, and automatically retrieves an email re-
cipient’s public keys as needed. Unfortunately, the mock-up
lacked a working key management system, instead relying on
hard-coded keys for email recipients, and did not simulate
the delay that occurs when a sender has to wait for the recip-
ient to generate and publish their public key. This made the
mock-up incompatible with our study of first-time users, and
it calls into question whether their results regarding the high
usability of automated PGP apply to the common scenario of
first-time PGP users.
Two prior studies included user interviews regarding secure
email. Renaud at al. [14] explored user’s understanding of
how email works and proposed some reasons why secure
email adoption is low. Gaw et al. [10] interviewed users at a
political activist organization that use secure email and noted
that adoption was driven by the organization deciding encryp-
tion was necessary (due to secrecy concerns), and having IT
staff setup the software for users enabled them to be success-
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ful. Even with this support, there were users who did not
intend to use the software regularly, due to usability concerns
and social factors.
SECURE EMAIL
Two and a half decades after the invention of PGP, secure
email still remains sparsely used. While some businesses re-
quire the use of secure email by their employees, there is lit-
tle use of secure email by the population at large. While it
is possible that secure email will eventually diffuse from the
workplace, it may be more likely that if secure email is to
flourish, it will do so because of grassroots adoption (i.e., if
participants are able to discover secure email on their own
and easily begin using it with their acquaintances).
To date, no secure email studies have tested the ability of two
novice users to begin using secure email; instead, these stud-
ies have tested a single novice user interacting with an expert
user (i.e., a study coordinator). Both Whitten and Tygar’s
study [26] as well as Garfinkel and Miller’s [9] study used a
simulated political campaign, where the study participant was
the only individual in the campaign who did not already know
how to use PGP. Similarly, studies in Sheng et al. [20], our
prior work [17], and Atwater et al. [1] involved participants
sending email to study coordinators, none of which were in-
structed to simulate a novice user.
Even if the study coordinators had attempted to simulate a
novice user, there are difficulties with this approach. First,
study coordinators are unlikely to make mistakes while using
the encryption software, which is atypical of a true novice.
Even if study coordinators make use of scripted mistakes,
there is a strong risk that these mistakes might be seen as
artificial by participants, thereby breaking immersion for the
participant. Second, in many tasks there is a high level of
variability possible in participant actions, making it difficult
to script for all possible situations, and unscripted responses
from coordinators are likely to be biased by their experience
with the system. Third, participants are likely to attribute any
problems they encounter to their own mistakes, and not to the
coordinator, whereas when interacting with a friend, partici-
pants are just as likely to attribute the mistake to their friend
as to themselves.1.
To avoid these difficulties, our study uses two novice partic-
ipants. This is the first study to test whether two novice par-
ticipants, who know each other beforehand, can successfully
use secure email in a grassroots fashion. Our observations,
as discussed later in this paper, show that this approach pro-
duces more natural behavior then when participants email a
study coordinator. Moreover, this approach allowed us to ex-
amine how users perform when they are introduced to secure
email in different ways (i.e., installing and then sending an
email vs. receiving an email and then installing).
To select which systems to test, we surveyed existing secure
email systems, including those listed on the EFF’s score-
card [7], and filtered them according to two criteria. First,
we focused on browser-based solutions, as previous work has
1In some ongoing work, we have attempted to simulate a novice user
and encountered these difficulties in practice [15]
shown that this approach is preferred by users [17, 1]. Sec-
ond, we required the systems to use automatic key manage-
ment, as research has shown that users are highly amenable
to this approach [9, 17].2 Of the systems that matched these
criteria, we found that they could be grouped into three types
of secure email systems: integrated, depot-based, and a hy-
brid of integrated and depot-based systems. For each of these
groups, we tested the systems in the group, and selected the
system that we felt had the best usability and included that
system in our study. The remainder of this section describes
the types of secure email that were tested, as well as the rep-
resentative system for each.
Integrated Secure Email (Pwm)
“Integrated secure email” refers to secure email systems that
integrate with users’ existing email systems. In this model,
users do not need to create new accounts and are able to en-
crypt messages within the email interfaces they are already
accustomed to [17].
Private WebMail (Pwm)3 is the representative system for this
type of secure email. Pwm was developed as part of our re-
search [17, 15] and has the highest usability4 of any secure
email system tested in the literature [15]. Similarly, because
Pwm has been studied before, it provides a good baseline for
comparing the results of the other systems tested in this study.
Pwm is a browser extension that tightly integrates with
Gmail’s web interface to provide secure email. Users are
never exposed to any cryptographic operation, including the
verification of the user’s identity, which is completed without
user interaction. Pwm modifies the color scheme of Gmail for
encrypted emails in order to help users identify which mes-
sages have been encrypted. Pwm also includes inline tutorials
that instruct users on how to operate Pwm.
Pwm’s threat model is focused on protecting email from in-
dividuals who do not have access to the sender’s or recipi-
ent’s email account. While this does not protect email against
attackers who compromise the user’s email account, it does
provide security during transmission and storage of the email.
Pwm is susceptible to a malicious email service provider.
Depot-Based Secure Email (Tutanota)
“Depot-based secure email” refers to secure email systems
that use a separate website from users’ existing email sys-
tems. In this model, users have a separate account with the
depot where they can send and receive secure emails. When
a user receives a new message in their depot account, many
depot-based systems will send an email to the user’s standard
email address, informing them that they have a new email to
check in the depot system. Often, these systems do not allow
users to send email to individuals not already using the depot.
Depot-based systems are commonly deployed by companies
and organizations for secure communication.
2We also investigated systems based on PGP, but found that these
systems all had low usability and chose not to include them in this
study (see Pilot Study).
3https://pwm.byu.edu/
4Based on the System Usability Scale [4].
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While there are many depot-based systems to choose from,
most are either costly (e.g., Hushmail and StartMail) or are
currently not offering email addresses to new users (e.g., Pro-
tonMail). We chose Tutanota5 because it was the most usable
of the depot systems we tested, is free, is currently available
to new users, and is receiving publicity on Twitter.
Tutanota assigns users an email address ending in “@tutan-
ota.com”. Users can send and receive email from this ad-
dress as they normally would. During account creation, Tu-
tanota generates a public/private key pair for the user. These
keys are stored on Tutanota’s servers, with the private key
being encrypted with the user’s Tutanota account password.
When Tutanota users send messages to other Tutanota users,
the messages are automatically encrypted and signed with the
appropriate keys. When a Tutanota user sends a message to a
non-Tutanota user, they have the option of encrypting it with
a shared secret (i.e., password). When the non-Tutanota user
receives the encrypted email, they are redirected to Tutan-
ota’s website, where they can enter the shared secret and de-
crypt the message. Tutanota’s interface also allows the non-
Tutanota user to respond to the message, and will encrypt the
message using the same shared secret.
The threat model for Tutanota is similar to Pwm, except
that instead of having normal and secure email stored in the
same email accounts, they are stored in separate accounts.
This means that if a user’s normal email account is broken
into, their sensitive messages are still secure. Users are still
susceptible to having their secure email account password
guessed/stolen or to a malicious email service provider.
Hybrid Secure Email (Virtru)
Virtru6 is a hybrid of integrated and depot-based secure email.
Once Virtru’s browser plugin is installed, it functions much
the same as Pwm, including automatic key management and
integration with Gmail. If a Virtru user sends an email to a
non-Virtru user, the sender still does so through Gmail, but
the recipient will receive an email informing them that they
need to log into Virtru’s website to view their message. At
this point Virtru is similar to Tutanota in its management of
new users, except that instead of providing a password, non-
Virtru users are asked to prove that they own their email ad-
dress. As such, the threat model for Virtru is identical to
Pwm.
METHODOLOGY
We conducted an IRB-approved user study wherein pairs of
participants used secure email to communicate sensitive in-
formation to each other. This section gives an overview of
the study and describes the scenario, task, study question-
naire, and post-study interview. In addition, we discuss the
development and limitations of the study.
Study Setup
The study ran for two weeks—beginning Tuesday, September
8, 2015 and ending Friday, September 18, 2015. In total,
25 pairs of participants (50 total participants) completed the
5https://tutanota.com/
6https://www.virtru.com/
study. Participants took between forty and sixty minutes to
complete the study, and each participant was compensated
$15 USD for their participation. Participants were required to
be accompanied by a friend, who served as their counterpart
for the study. For standardization and requirements of the
systems tested in the study, both participants were required to
have Gmail accounts.
When participants arrived, they were read a brief introduc-
tion detailing the study and their rights as participants. Par-
ticipants were informed that they would be in separate rooms
during the study and would use email to communicate with
each other.7 Participants were also informed that a study co-
ordinator would be with them at all times and could answer
any questions they might have.
Using a coin flip, one participant was randomly assigned as
Participant A (referred to as “Johnny” throughout the paper)
and the other as Participant B (referred to as “Jane” through-
out the paper). The participants were then led to the appropri-
ate room to begin the study; each room had identical equip-
ment. For the remainder of the study, all instructions were
provided in written form. Participants completed the task on a
virtual machine (VM), which was restored to a common snap-
shot after each study task, ensuring that the computer started
in the same state for all participants and that no participant
information was accidentally stored.
During the study, participants were asked to complete a multi-
stage task three times, once for each of the secure email sys-
tems being tested: Pwm, Tutanota, and Virtru. The order
in which the participants used the systems was randomized.
For each system, participants installed any necessary software
and were then given fifteen minutes to complete the task. If
they were unable to complete the task in the time limit, the
study coordinators helped them move to the next system. In
practice, this only occurred a single time.
Demographics
We recruited Gmail users for our study at a local university.
Participants were two-thirds female: female (33; 66%), male
(17; 34%). Participants skewed young: 18 to 24 years old
(44; 88%), 25 to 34 years old (6; 12%).
We distributed posters across campus to avoid biasing our
results to any particular major. All participants were uni-
versity students,8 with the majority being undergraduate stu-
dents: undergraduate students (40; 80%), graduate students
(10; 20%). Participants were enrolled in a variety of majors,
including both technical and non-technical majors. No major
was represented by more than four participants, with the vast
majority only having one or two participants.
Scenario Design
During the study, participants were asked to role-play a sce-
nario about completing taxes. Each participant was shown the
following text, respectively.
7The study coordinators ensured that the participants knew each
other’s email addresses.
8We did not require this.
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• Johnny. Your friend graduated in accounting and you have
asked their help in preparing your taxes. They told you that
they needed you to email them your last year’s tax PIN
and your social security number. Since this information
is sensitive, you want to protect (encrypt) this information
when you send it over email.
• Jane. You graduated in accounting and have agreed to help
a friend prepare their taxes. You have asked them to email
you their last year’s tax PIN and their social security num-
ber.
Participants were provided with the information they would
send (e.g., SSN and PIN), but were told to treat this informa-
tion as they would their own sensitive information.
Task Design
Based on the scenario, participants were asked to complete a
three-stage task.
1. Johnny would encrypt and send their SSN and last year’s
tax PIN to Jane.
2. Jane would reply to this sensitive information with a con-
firmation code and this year’s tax PIN. This information
would also be encrypted.
3. Johnny would reply and let Jane know he had received the
confirmation code and last year’s tax PIN.
The instructions guiding the participants through the three
stages are as follows:
• Johnny. In this task, you’ll be using {Pwm, Virtru, or
Mailvelope}. The system can be found at the follow-
ing website: {Appropriate Website}. Please encrypt and
send the following information to your friend using {Pwm,
Virtru, or Mailvelope}: SSN: {Generated SSN}. PIN:
{Generated PIN}.
Once you have received the confirmation code and PIN
from your friend, send an email to your friend letting them
know you have received this information. After you have
sent this confirmation email, let the study coordinator know
you have finished this task.
• Jane – Sheet 1. Please wait for your friend’s email with
their last year’s tax PIN and SSN. Once you have written
down your friend’s SSN and PIN, let the study coordinator
know that you are ready to reply to your friend with their
confirmation code and PIN.
• Jane – Sheet 2. You have completed your friend’s taxes
and need to send them the confirmation code and this year’s
tax PIN from their tax submission. Since your friend used
{Pwm, Virtru, or Tutanota} to send sensitive information
to you, please also use {Pwm, Virtru, or Tutanota} to send
them the confirmation code and PIN. Confirmation Code:
{Generated code}. PIN: {Generated PIN}.
Once you have sent the confirmation code and PIN to your
friend, wait for them to reply to you and confirm they re-
ceived the information. Once you have received this con-
firmation, let the study coordinator know you have finished
this task.
The instructions for Johnny and Sheet 1 of the instructions for
Jane were given at the start of the task. Sheet 2 for Jane was
given once Johnny had received and decrypted the sensitive
information sent by Jane in Stage 1. Participants completed
this task once for each of the three systems being tested. Each
time, the instructions only included information relevant to
the system being tested.
While participants waited for email from each other, they
were told that they could browse the Internet, use their
phones, or engage in other similar activities. This was done
to provide a more natural setting for the participants, and to
avoid frustration if participants had to wait for an extended
period of time while their friend figured out an encrypted
email system.
Study coordinators were allowed to answer questions related
to the study but were not allowed to provide instructions on
how to use any of the systems being tested. If participants
became stuck and asked for help, they were told that they
could take whatever steps they normally would to solve a sim-
ilar problem. Additionally, when asked for help, if the study
coordinator believed communication between the two parties
could help, he could remind participants that they were free
to communicate with their friend and that only the sensitive
information was required to be transmitted over secure email.
Study Questionnaire
We administered our study using the Qualtrics web-based
survey software. Before beginning the survey, participants
answered a set of demographic questions. Participants then
completed the study task for each of the three secure email
systems.
Immediately upon completing the study task for a given se-
cure email system, participants were asked several questions
related to their experience with that system. First, partici-
pants completed the ten questions from the System Usability
Scale (SUS) [4, 5]. Multiple studies have shown that SUS is a
good indicator of perceived usability [23], is consistent across
populations [18], and has been used in the past to rate secure
email systems [17, 1]. After providing a SUS score, partici-
pants were asked to describe what they liked about each sys-
tem, what they would change, and why they would change
it.
After completing the task and questions for all three secure
email systems, participants were asked to select which of the
encrypted email systems they had used was their favorite, and
to describe why they liked this system. Participants were
next asked to rate the following statements using a five-point
Likert-scale (Strongly Disagree—Strongly Agree): “I want
to be able to encrypt my email,” and “I would encrypt email
frequently.”
Post-Study Interview
After completing the survey, participants were interviewed
by their respective study coordinator. The coordinator asked
participants about their general impressions of the study and
the secure email systems they had used. Furthermore, the
coordinators were instructed to note when the participants
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struggled or had other interesting events occur, and during
the post-study interview the coordinators reviewed and fur-
ther explored these events with the participants.
After the participants completed their individual post-study
interviews, they were brought together for a final post-study
interview. First, participants were once again asked which
system was their favorite and why. This question was in-
tended to observe how participants’ preferences might change
when they could discuss their favorite system with each other.
Second, participants were asked to describe their ideal secure
email system. While participants are not system designers,
our experience has shown that participants often reveal pref-
erences that otherwise remain unspoken. Finally, participants
were asked to share their opinions related to doing a study
with a friend. They were informed that it was the first time
that we had conducted such a study. This question was de-
signed to learn possible benefits and limitations of conducting
such a two-person study.
Pilot Study
We conducted a pilot study with three pairs of participants
(six participants total). The lessons learned during the pilot
study motivated two minor changes to the study. First, the pi-
lot study included Mailvelope, a PGP-based secure email sys-
tem, in addition to the other systems. In the pilot study, par-
ticipants rated Mailvelope as having low usability, and even
with prior PGP experience participants took between fifteen
and thirty minutes to complete the task. For these reasons, it
was clear that Mailvelope was not compatible with our study
setup (which was limited to one hour), and we did not include
it the final study.9 Second, in the pilot study, participants were
shown all instructions within the Qualtrics survey. After the
pilot, we printed out the task instructions and gave these to
users for easier reference.
Limitations
During the study, a bug in the Qualtrics software led to an un-
even distribution of treatments (i.e., order the systems were
used). Due to this problem, treatments where Virtru was the
first system tested made up two-thirds (68%, n=17) of the
studies. Other than this abnormality, treatment distribution
was as expected. We examined all of our qualitative data and,
after adjusting for this abnormality, found no statistically sig-
nificant difference and only one observable difference, which
we note in the Results section.
Our study also has limitations common to all existing secure
email studies. First, our populations are not representative of
all groups, and future research could broaden the population
(e.g., non-students, non-Gmail users). Second, our study was
a short-term study, and future research should look at these
issues in a longer-term longitudinal study. Third, our study is
a lab study and has limitations common to all studies run in a
trusted environment [12, 21].
9Instead, we ran a separate study that used the same methodology,
but only examined Mailvelope [16]
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Pwm Johnny 25 76.3 15.3 35.0 72.5 75.0 82.5 100
Pwm Jane 25 69.1 17.2 30.0 32.5 70.0 80.0 100
Pwm Both 50 72.7 16.5 30.0 65.0 72.5 82.5 100
Virtru Johnny 25 73.1 14.7 27.5 70.0 75.0 80.0 97.5
Virtru Jane 25 71.4 12.7 40.0 67.5 75.0 77.5 87.5
Virtru Both 50 72.3 13.7 27.5 67.5 75.5 80.0 97.5
Tutanota Johnny 25 50.0 18.2 27.5 35.0 50.0 62.5 92.5
Tutanota Jane 25 54.3 17.4 22.5 42.5 55.0 35.0 90.0
Tutanota Both 50 52.2 17.8 22.5 40.0 25.5 65.0 92.5
Table 1. SUS Scores
RESULTS
In this section, we report the quantitative results from our user
study. First, we report on the usability scores for each sys-
tem. Next, we give the time taken to complete the task for
each system as well as the number of mistakes encountered
while using each system. Finally, we report which system
participants indicated was their favorite.
The data from our study, along with screenshots of each sys-
tem, is available at http://chi2016.isrl.byu.edu/.
System Usability Scale
We evaluated each system using the System Usability Scale
(SUS). A breakdown of the SUS score for each system and
type of participant (i.e., Participant A—Johnny, Participant
B—Jane, or both) is given in Table 1. The mean value is used
as the SUS score [4].
When evaluating whether a participant’s role as Johnny or
Jane affected the SUS score, we found a statistically signifi-
cant difference for Pwm (two-tailed student t-test, equal vari-
ance — p = 0.05). For the other two systems, the differences
in SUS scores were slight and were not statistically significant
(two-tailed student t-test, equal variance — Virtru – p = 0.67,
Tutanota – p = 0.30).
To give greater context to the meaning of each system’s SUS
score, we leveraged the work of several researchers. Bangor
et al. [3] analyzed 2,324 SUS surveys and derived a set of ac-
ceptability ranges that describe whether a system with a given
score is acceptable to users in terms of usability. Bangor et
al. also associated specific SUS scores with adjective descrip-
tions of the system’s usability. Using this data, we generated
ranges for these adjective ratings, such that a score is corre-
lated with the adjective it is closest to in terms of standard
deviations. Sauro et al. [19] also analyzed SUS scores from
Bangor et al. [2], Tullis et al. [23], and their own data. They
calculated the percentile values for SUS scores and assigned
letter grades based on percentile ranges. These contextual
clues are presented in Figure 1.
Pwm and Virtru’s SUS scores of 72.7 and 72.3, respectively,
are rated as having “Good” usability. Both systems fall right
at the 65th percentile and on the line between a “B” and “C”
grade. The difference between these two systems is not statis-
tically significant (two-tailed student t-test, matched pairs —
p = 0.86). The scores for Pwm are roughly consistent with
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Figure 1. Adjective-based Ratings to Help Interpret SUS Scores
St
ag
e
C
ou
nt
M
ea
n
St
an
da
rd
D
ev
ia
tio
n
M
in
Q
1
M
ed
ia
n
Q
3
M
ax
Pwm 1 25 2:29 0:49 1:32 1:46 2:14 2:45 4:09
Pwm 2 24 2:59 0:52 1:24 2:23 2:51 3:27 5:05
Pwm Both 49 5:28 1:22 2:56 4:38 5:08 6:17 9:14
Virtru 1 25 2:39 1:09 1:23 1:51 1:51 2:54 5:46
Virtru 2 23 3:06 1:53 0:59 2:02 2:50 3:22 9:22
Virtru Both 48 5:48 2:55 2:27 4:02 5:07 6:12 15:08
Tutanota 1 25 3:49 1:04 2:17 3:01 3:40 4:27 6:26
Tutanota 2 24 5:49 3:38 1:20 3:53 5:15 6:41 18:53
Tutanota Both 49 9:41 3:54 4:11 7:45 9:06 10:49 22:26
Table 2. Time Taken to Complete Task (min:sec)
those seen in prior work [17, 15], though our results exhibited
more low outliers than prior studies. Whether this difference
is due to negative experience related to using these systems
with a friend as compared to a study coordinator or whether
it is due to differences in the study populations is unclear.
Tutanota’s score of 52.2 is rated as having “OK” usability. It
falls in just about the 15th percentile and at just about the base
of the “D” grade. The difference between Tutanota and the
other systems (i.e., Pwm and Virtru) is statistically significant
(two-tailed student t-test, matched pairs — p < 0.001)
Time
We recorded the time it took each participant to finish the
task. Completion times are split into two stages:
1. Timing for this stage started when Johnny clicked the “In-
stall” (Pwm, Virtru) or “Sign Up” button. Timing ended
when Johnny had successfully sent an encrypted email with
their SSN and last year’s tax PIN.
2. Timing for this stage started when Jane opened the en-
crypted email sent in the previous stage. Timing ended
after Jane had successfully sent an encrypted email with
the confirmation code and this year’s tax PIN. This stage
included the time Jane spent determining how to decrypt
the initial message. In the case of Tutanota, this included
obtaining the shared secret from Johnny.
Timings were calculated using the recorded video. There
were two sessions with abnormalities in the recording. First,
the Virtru portion of a Jane session had become corrupted.
Second, an entire Jane session was also corrupted. This sec-
ond session was of special note because this participant failed
to successfully complete Stage 2 using Tutanota. The remain-
ing times are reported in Table 2 and are graphically shown
in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Time to complete task stages
In line with the SUS scores, both Pwm and Virtru have com-
pletion times that are roughly the same, with any differences
failing to be statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test,
matched pairs — Stage 1 – p = 0.58, Stage 2 – p = 0.73,
Total – p = 0.58).10 Participants using Tutanota took roughly
one minute longer to complete Stage 1 and almost three min-
utes longer to complete Stage 2. The differences between Tu-
tanota and Pwm/Virtru in Stage 1, Stage 2, and the combined
times are all statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test,
matched pairs — each case – p < 0.002)
Mistakes
We defined mistakes as any situation in which sensitive infor-
mation was sent in plaintext or was sent encrypted along with
the key to decrypt the sensitive information (i.e., the Tutanota
shared secret was sent as plaintext in email). Using Pwm, no
participants sent their sensitive data in the clear. With Virtru,
only a single participant sent their information in the clear.
In this case, the participant had entered the sensitive infor-
mation into an unencrypted greeting field that Virtru allows
participants to include with an encrypted email.
In contrast, participants were much more likely to make mis-
takes with Tutanota. Two-thirds of the participant pairs (68%,
n=17) communicated the Tutanota shared secret over clear
text in email. Additionally, half of the participant pairs (48%,
n=12) selected shared secrets that had low entropy and could
be quickly guessed by a password-cracking system.
10After adjusting the data for the higher number of treatments in
which Virtru was the first system tested, we found that on average
Johnny’s task completion time dropped by 15 seconds for Virtru and
increased by 10 seconds for Pwm. These differences are not sta-
tistically significant from the non-adjusted data, and the difference
between Virtru and Pwm in the adjusted data is not statistically sig-
nificant.
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Johnny Jane Total
Pwm 48% 60% 54%
Virtru 44% 28% 36%
Tutanota 4% 12% 8%
Disliked All 4% 0% 2%
Table 3. Participants’ Favorite Systems
While Tutanota clearly performed worse than Pwm and
Virtru, care should be taken in analyzing this result. In the
post-study interview several participants indicated that while
they had transmitted their password over email in the study,
they stated that in the real world they would be more likely to
send the data over a different channel.
Favorite System
At the end of the study, participants were asked which of the
three systems was their favorite. Their responses are summa-
rized in Table 3. Pwm was most frequently rated as the best
system, with Virtru also rated highly. Tutanota was rarely se-
lected as the best system, and one participant indicated that
they disliked all of the systems. These results roughly corre-
late with the SUS score of each system.
Interestingly, we do see a difference in the choice of favorite
system based on what role the participant played. While Pwm
and Virtru are rated as the favorite system about equally by
Johnny, Pwm was most often selected as the favorite system
by Jane. Based on participant responses, this disparity is due
to the fact that unlike Johnny, Jane had to leave Gmail to in-
teract with Virtru messages, a process that was frequently de-
scribed negatively.
Similarly, Tutanota was more highly rated by Jane than by
Johnny. Participant responses reveal that this is likely due
to the fact that Jane did not have to go through the Tutanota
account setup (which required a long, complex password) and
selection of a shared secret for the email (which caused nearly
all participants to struggle).
Differences Based on Treatment
In Atwater et al.’s work [1], they noticed that the order in
which users tested systems strongly affected the SUS score
for those systems. We analyzed our results to determine if
we saw a similar affect, but found that the order in which the
systems were tested had no effect on SUS scores. This is in
line with our prior experience using SUS to evaluate secure
email systems [17].
We also evaluated the data to see if the order in which users
tested systems affected task completion time, number of mis-
takes, or participant’s favorite systems. The only measur-
able difference was in task completion times for Pwm and
Virtru: whichever system was tested first would have a longer
than average task completion time, and whichever system was
tested second would have a lower than average task comple-
tion time. This difference in times was not statistically signif-
icant, but this is likely because the sample population was too
small.
DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss themes that we noticed across the
study, especially the qualitative feedback provided by partic-
ipants on the study survey and in the post-study interview.
Participants have all been assigned a unique identifier R[1-
25][A,B]. The final letter refers to which role the participant
played during the study, and participants with the same num-
ber were paired with each other (e.g., R1A and R1B were
Johnny and Jane, respectively, in the same study session).
Two-Person Studies
During the study, we noticed several clear benefits of con-
ducting two person studies.
First, by having participants play different roles, we were able
to gather data about users’ experiences both when they are
introduced to secure email and when someone else is intro-
ducing them. For example, in Tutanota, messages need to
have a shared secret to be encrypted. Johnny’s experiences re-
vealed the difficulty in discovering that a password is required
and needs to be communicated to the recipient, Jane. Simi-
larly, Jane’s experience showed the aversion participants felt
to leaving their current email system to view a sensitive mes-
sage. While these same experiences might have been elicited
by running two different studies, it was convenient to obtain
them in a single study, and it was helpful to be able to corre-
late the experiences of participant pairs. Furthermore, show-
ing that a participant can successfully use a new secure email
system when inducted by another novice user is stronger than
only showing that a new user can be inducted by an expert.
Second, this study design led to more natural behaviors by
participants. In past studies, we observed that participants ex-
pected study coordinators to immediately respond to emails.
Even after being informed that a response would take a couple
of minutes, participants would constantly refresh their inbox
to see if a message had arrived, and if a response took longer
than fifteen to thirty seconds to arrive participants would often
complain. In contrast, participants in this study were content
to wait to receive their email and did not appear agitated when
their friends took a long time to respond. Also, instead of con-
stantly refreshing their inbox, participants would browse the
Web or check their phones, which is likely more representa-
tive of how they use email in practice.
In addition to these observations by study coordinators, par-
ticipants also noted that they felt more natural interacting with
a friend than with a study coordinator. For example, partici-
pants R24B and R25A stated, respectively,
“...I was more at ease probably than I would’ve been
if it was someone random on the other end...It would’ve
felt more mechanical, robotic, whereas I know [her] and
I was calling my wife, ‘Hi wife! What’s the password?’
It felt a lot more personable for me I think....”
“It was good in that you saw the troubles, like the third
system [Tutanota], I didn’t even know how it worked, so
I ended up sending an email to myself on Gmail so then
I could see what was happening on her end, to know
like how it works on the other end. So I think it’s good
to have two people on each end that don’t know what’s
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going on, because if it weren’t I’d assume the person on
the other side had done it before...”
Third, participants indicated that because the study was con-
ducted with their friend that they felt more relaxed. For ex-
ample, participants R11B and R14B indicated, respectively,
“I thought it was good, I dunno, might’ve taken the pres-
sure off too, where it’s like, ‘Okay, he’s figuring this out
too’, so I can just, y’know, I don’t have to feel as ‘under-
the-microscope’ in the study.”
“I felt like neither of us knew what we were doing, but
if I knew that someone else knew what was going on, I’d
be like, ‘K, hopefully I’m not doing it wrong,’ so it’s kind
of like, ‘K, we’re on the same page, neither of us know
what we’re doing.’ ”
Fourth, we were pleased to note that requiring participants to
bring a friend with them resulted in a much lower missed-
appointment rate than we have seen in the past.
Based on our observation of participants’ behavior and the
participants’ qualitative feedback, we feel that there is sig-
nificant value in conducting two person studies. Still, fu-
ture research should examine in greater depth the differ-
ences between one and two person studies. For example, an
A/B study comparing these two methodologies could be con-
ducted which compares difference in system metrics (e.g.,
SUS, task completion time) as well measures difference in
users agitation during the study (e.g., heart rate, eye track-
ing). Similarly, research could compare how participant ex-
periences differ when both roles are filled by a novice, as op-
posed to having one simulated by a coordinator.
Hidden Details and Trust
Providing further evidence to prior work [6, 17], partici-
pants’ experiences demonstrated that when security details
were hidden from them, they were less likely to trust the sys-
tem. This was most clearly demonstrated when examining
Pwm and Virtru. Both systems use email-based identification
and authentication [8] to verify the user’s identity to a key es-
crow server (i.e., it sends an email to the user with a link to
click on to verify their identity). The difference is that while
Virtru requires users to manually open this email and click
on the link, Pwm performs this task automatically for users.
While this difference might seem small, it was cause for con-
cern for several participants. For example, participants R6B
and R10B expressed, respectively,
“I liked the way that one [Virtru] and the last one [Tu-
tanota] both had ways to confirm that it was you and no
one else could see the information.”
“(Interviewer: But you didn’t think that [Pwm] was as
secure [Virtru]?) [Pwm] said that it was, but I liked
how the other ones had additional ’send-you-an-email’
verification or a password between you and the other
person in the email. Just an added measure to feel like
there really is something different. ’Cause Pwm for all I
know, like, I’m just taking their word for it. There’s not
really anything extra that shows that it really is secure.”
In contrast, the shared secret used by Tutanota made it clear
that only the recipient who had the password would be able
to read the message. This made a large number of partici-
pants feel that Tutanota was the most secure system, even if
usability issues prevented it from being their favorite system.
R17B’s response demonstrate this principle:
“Like the order of the programs was interesting ’cause
I thought the Virtru one was great, like until I saw this
[Tutanota], ‘Oh, this one [Tutanota] requires a pass-
word - why did I think that one [Virtru] was great?’ And
I wish, it would have required a password because any-
body that has your email password can just see [every-
thing].”
The sentiment regarding passwords was so strong that several
participants stated that they wished Pwm and Virtru would
also allow them to password-encrypt messages. For example,
R17B, R10A, and R10B expressed, respectively,
“I like that [Pwm] encrypted the info so that Gmail
couldn’t read it. I think Pwm would be the best one if
it required passwords.”
“R10B: I would say exactly the second one [Pwm],
just with a password (R10A: ’Yeah’) per conversation
is what I would do. Just because it’s so simple, right
there. R10A: Stay on Gmail, but then have a password
to get to that encrypted email. (R10B: ’Yeah’)”
Still, not all participants were enamored with using a shared
password, seeing it as an added memory burden or hassle. As
stated by participants R10A, R5A, and R25A, respectively,
“I will never remember my crazy password.”
“I don’t know if I loved the password idea, just because
if I was sending a secure password over something, then
why didn’t I just send the information over that any-
ways?”
“How do you send a password safely if your encrypting
program requires a password?”
Some participants were concerned that it was impossible to
verify if any of the systems were truly encrypting their data.
This likely stems from two facts: first, that participants are
not security experts and lack the means to truly verify the se-
curity of a tool, and second, that the tools themselves—once
working—never show the user any indication that they are ac-
tually receiving encrypted email. While results from Atwater
et al. suggest that showing ciphertext does not address this is-
sue [1], the fact that participants are concerned indicates that
this problem needs more research. For example, participants
R14A and R17B stated, respectively,
“It would be kind of cool to see what it would look like
as an encrypted message. ...Seems kind of weird. Like
‘it’s encrypted now, trust us.’ ”
“I would like to know exactly how the encryption hap-
pens - I understand that it is encrypting it, but how do
I know it’s completely safe?...There are too many pro-
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grams that are not what they seem, and I would not want
this to be one of those.”
Integrated vs Depot
Participants overwhelmingly preferred secure email to be in-
tegrated into their existing email systems and not require a
second account (i.e., a depot). This preference was expressed
through the low SUS scores of Tutanota and the fact that only
four participants rated it as their favorite system. Addition-
ally, participant comments made it clear that they were not
interested in using depot-based secure email. For example,
participants R25A and R16A stated, respectively,
“No one wants another email system.”
“It is just not my type. I don’t want to set up another
account and send a password to my friend.”
However, several participants felt that Tutanota was more se-
cure than other systems, precisely because it required the cre-
ation of an account separate from Gmail. Participants noted
that in Pwm and Virtru, access to the user’s Gmail account
was all that was required to decrypt sensitive email. For
example, participants R4B, R25A, and R25B stated, respec-
tively,
“[I like it,] I dunno, just because I leave my email up a
lot, someone could just go on to my email and look at it.
I don’t sign out of my email.”
“I just kinda feel like anybody could go into your email
and look at those secure ones if it is inside your email...”
“How strong is your Gmail password, you know? If
you can get in there, then it defeats these other encryp-
tion. So, really, you’re just trying to hide your stuff from
Google, which, they already know everything, so.”
Tutorials
Tutorials were a significant factor in participants’ experi-
ences. Pwm was rated by participants as having the best tu-
torials, with a fourth of participants (24%, n=12) bringing up
tutorials when asked what they liked about Pwm. Participants
largely liked the style of the tutorials as well as their content.
For example, participant 8B expressed, “I also really liked the
tutorial. It was similar to tutorials Apple or Google/Gmail
give you to learn things.”
Virtru also has tutorials, but praise for these tutorials was not
as common as it was with Pwm, with Jane participants criti-
cizing the tutorials more than Johnny participants. This result
can likely be attributed to the fact that the Virtru plugin walks
new users through a tutorial upon installation, but someone
who receives a Virtru-encrypted message without the plugin
is simply presented with a blue button labeled ”Unlock mes-
sage” without additional instruction beyond what the sender
of the email has personally and manually added. This is in
contrast to Pwm, which prefaces incoming encrypted email
with instructions on what encrypted email is and how the re-
cipient should go about decrypting the message.
Tutanota had no tutorials, and this clearly led to confusion.
Nearly all participants failed to notice that they needed to set
a password to encrypt their email, and just as many didn’t re-
alize that they needed to communicate this password to the
other participant. Additionally, some participants didn’t un-
derstand that they couldn’t just use Tutanota to communicate
the password Many of these problems could have been alle-
viated by a simple tutorial.
Reasons to Use Encrypted Email
The majority of participants (72%) agreed with the survey
statement, “I want to be able to encrypt my email,” although
only a much smaller fraction (20%) agreed with the idea that
they would “encrypt email frequently.” Still, when asked
to describe how they would use encrypted email in prac-
tice, many participants were unsure. The range of opinions
are summarized in responses from participants R22A, R24A,
R20A, and R23B, respectively, on how they would use secure
email in practice:
“Um, I’ve never really used it before because I didn’t
know it was so accessible through Gmail so now that I
know I can, I will use it more often. (Interviewer: Do
you actually plan to use it?) Yeah, I will.”
“Like, just the other day I needed [my husband’s] so-
cial security card number for something and then didn’t
feel like there was any way I could ask him and if I had
known about this, I would have done that.”
“Well, I’m trying to think when I would need to. It would
be nice to have it, in case, but I don’t know if there’s
anyone I would need to send that information to.”
“Knowing that I could encrypt email I probably could
find uses for it, but...”
These responses indicate that more research needs to be done
to discover under what circumstances the users would employ
secure email.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we conducted the first two-person study of se-
cure email where two novice users are brought into the lab
together and asked to exchange secure email between them-
selves. Our study analyzed Pwm, Tutanota, and Virtru. Using
a two-person study enabled us see participants under differ-
ent first-use experiences. In addition, participants exhibited
more natural behaviors, seemed less agitated, and indicated
that they felt less like they were “under the microscope.”
Our results indicate several observations about secure email
systems. First, we found further evidence that hiding the se-
curity details can lead to a lack of trust in the secure email
system. This gives further credence to similar results from
earlier work [17]. Second, we found that participants largely
rejected depot-based secure email systems. Third, partici-
pant success in using a system without mistakes is heavily
influenced by the presence of well-designed tutorials. Lastly,
while participants are interested in using secure email, few
express a desire to use it regularly and most are unsure of
when or how they would use it in practice.
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